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NLRB v. KNUTH BROTHERS:
THE BOUNDARIES OF UNPROTECTED "DISLOYALTY"
WHEN A NON-STRIKING EMPLOYEE'S SECTION 7
CONCERTED ACTIVITY THREATENS
EMPLOYEE-CUSTOMER RELATIONS
Knuth Brothers produces print work subcontracted to it by
dealers who solicit the work from the ultimate customers. To
ensure their position as middlemen, the dealers insist that Knuth
not identify itself to the ultimate customer. In the spring of
1974, a Knuth employee, while engaged in concerted union
activity,' negligently violated this confidence by contacting an
ultimate customer. He was fired, and his union filed charges of
unfair labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). The General Counsel issued a complaint charging that
Knuth violated sections 8(a)(1)2 and 8(a)(3) 3 of the National
Labor Relations Act 4 on the ground that the employee's section
75 right to engage in concerted activity protected him from dis-
charge. The Administrative Law Judge upheld the complaints,
6
and the NLRB affirmed 7 as to the section 8(a)(1) violation with-
out reaching the section 8(a)(3) question. 8 The Seventh Circuit,
however, refused to enforce the NLRB's order,9 holding that an
employee forfeits section 7 protection when in the course of
concerted activity he negligently violates a trust between his em-
ployer and a customer. This result followed even though the em-
ployee involved did not intend to damage relations with the
I See text accompanying note 63 iqfra.
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), making it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in [§ 7]."
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), making it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization."
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-97 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), providing in part: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection."
I Knuth Bros., 218 N.L.R.B. 869, 871-76 (1975) (reproducing opinion of Adminis-
trative Law Judge).
7 Id. at 869 (NLRB opinion).
8
Id. at 869 n.1.
9 NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).
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customer-dealer and the employer had failed to put him on
notice that such a trust existed." ° The court reasoned that the
employee "never had any excuse whatever for meddling in his
Employer's dealings with its customers,""1 and therefore that he
had been disloyal in failing to take care to protect a confidence
that he never knew existed. In so holding, the court ignored the
previously accepted sine qua non of a finding of a "disloyal"
breach of confidence: that the employee be on notice that he is
threatening a valuable interest of his employer. 12 The court was
compelled to reach this curious result by the great weight it
assigned to the employer's interest in insulating his customer
relations from the effects of labor disputes involving non-
striking employees.'
3
This Comment will examine the importance of Knuth
Brothers as an exception to the general rule of section 7 protec-
tion for concerted activities. Particular attention will be given to
the line of "disloyalty" cases, on which the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing is based. Through this examination of the "disloyalty" doc-
trine as it existed prior to Knuth Brothers, the Comment will sug-
gest that the case departs significantly from prior case law, and
that this departure is neither desirable nor wise.
I. KNUTHBROTHERS AND THE SCOPE OF A NON-STRIKING
EMPLOYEE'S PROTECTION IN DEALING WITH CUSTOMERS
Knuth Brothers is a wholesale printer of business forms. It
has no sales force of its own and depends upon its dealers to
generate demand for its operations. 14 The dealers frequently
insist that ultimate customers not know that their order has been
subcontracted, or to whom it has been subcontracted, for fear
that customers might attempt to by-pass the middleman and
avoid paying the dealer's mark up.15 Knuth Brothers presented
convincing evidence that it took precautions to guard its
anonymity; 16 however, those precautions were found insufficient
1. 218 N.L.R.B. at 876.
"537 F.2d at 956 (quoting 218 N.L.R.B. at 871 (Member Kennedy, dissenting)).
12 See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra.
'" See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
14 537 F.2d at 951.
151d.
" Knuth presented evidence attesting to the existence of an important trust be-
tween its dealers and itself. When necessary to clarify specifications of a job in progress,
specifically designated individuals were authorized to make contact only with the dealer.
218 N.L.R.B. at 871. Although customer contacts were not explicitly forbidden, all
newly hired employees were told by Knuth's vice-president that the company had no
contact with ultimate consumers. 537 F.2d at 951-52. The existence of a trust was
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to warn its employees of the confidential nature of that
relationship.'
7
Phillip Popovitch, the discharged employee, was a pressman
and member of the Milwaukee Printing Pressmen and Assistants
Union No. 7;18 this union had been certified as the pressmen's
bargaining representative in July, 1973.19 Their negotiations
with Knuth, however, had not yielded an acceptable contract by
March, 1974.2) In order to improre their bargaining position,
the pressmen decided to organize the firm's production
employees. 21 Popovitch was very active in this organizational
campaign. It came to his attention that the Schlitz Brewing
Company, an end-user customer with whom Knuth had no di-
rect business relationship, currently had a job in the plant.
22
Popovitch knew that Schlitz was a union employer and believed
that it dealt only with other unionized firms. He thought it
would be helpful in the organizational campaign if he could tell
the production employees that Knuth was awarded the Schlitz
business because the pressmen were unionized,23 and that a fully
unionized shop might attract more business from other union-
ized firms. 24 In order to verify this prospective campaign pro-
paganda, Popovitch called an employee in Schlitz's purchas-
ing department, identified himself, and asked whether Schlitz
considered union status in awarding work contracts.2
5 In an ef-
fort to determine Schlitz's policy, the Schlitz employee contacted
the dealer.
26
further supported by an employment contract clause common to many firms in the
area, which provided that:
The Union realizes delicate confidences often necessary between the manage-
ment of a firm and its employees and agrees to hold any and all private matter
acquired by its members in their employment as a sacred trust not to be im-
parted to others or discussed outside the shop in which they are employed.
218 N.L.R.B. at 871 n.2. Knuth, however, was not a party to that contract. 537 F.2d at
955. Knuth showed that when it shipped a completed job directly to a customer, it was
always shipped in the name of the aealer. Id. at 951. Finally, Knuth showed that previ-
ously it had lost the business of a dealer account when it accidentally revealed to a
customer that it was doing that dealer's work. Id. at 955.
7See 218 N.L.R.B. at 876.
18 537 F.2d at 952.
19 218 N.L.R.B. at 872.
24) Id.
21 Id.
22 537 F.2d at 952.
23 218 N.L.R.B. at 872.
24 Id. The prospect of getting additional work was a matter of considerable concern
for Knuth's employees since the majority of them were able to work only part time. Id.
at 873 n.8.
25 537 F.2d at 952.
26 Id. The Schlitz employee testified that Popovitch "was wondering why he had a
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The dealer, Prismagraphics, one of Knuth's oldest and
largest dealer accounts, was responsible for over $100,000 worth
of Knuth's business. 27 As a result of the call, Prismagraphics
accused Knuth of violating a trust and questioned whether their
business relationship could continue. 28  Knuth discharged
Popovitch. The union filed charges of unfair labor practices, and
the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act.29
In a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge the Gen-
eral Counsel charged that Knuth used the incident as a pretext
to rid itself of an active union organizer, and that the discharge,
therefore, was motivated by the desire to discriminate against
union activity in violation of section 8(a)(3). He further alleged
that even if the reason given for the discharge was not merely a
pretext for anti-union discrimination, Popovitch's call was
nonetheless concerted activity, and, as such, was protected from
employer interference.3 " Knuth alleged that Popovitch intended
to cause a consumer boycott31 and that he breached an impor-
tant confidence. 32 It portrayed his action as "disloyalty" unpro-
tected. by section 7 and as constituting cause for discharge.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Popovitch's call
to Schlitz was the sole reason for his discharge; Knuth was not
motivated by intent to discriminate against union activity.33 She
job in his plant, since they [Knuth] were not union and we were." Id. She responded
that "it doesn't seem right that the work should go to a non-union shop." Id. The
Administrative Law Judge credited Popovitch's testimony that he did not intend to
jeopardize Knuth's Schlitz business, 218 N.L.R.B. at 875 n.16, and the Seventh Circuit
accepted this finding. 537 F.2d at 953 n.4.
27 537 F.2d at 952.
2 8 Id. at 953. A Prismagraphics salesman telephoned Popovitch and told him that
he, the salesman, would have been in serious trouble but for the fortuitous circum-
stance that Schlitz was already aware that its work was "farmed out." Id. at 952. The
evidence indicated, however, that Schlitz was not aware the work was subcontracted to
an only partially unionized firm. Id. at 952-53 n.3. The evidence further indicated that
Prismagraphics was "irate," 218 N.L.R.B. at 873, partly because Knuth could not control
its employees. 537 F.2d at 955. The Seventh Circuit believed that the discharge was
justified if only to assuage Prismagraphics' anger. Id. No actual business loss was re-
quired to substantiate the existence of a legitimate business interest. Id.
29 218 N.L.R.B. at 871.
3, Id. at 874.
3, 537 F.2d at 954-55.
32 218 N.L.R.B. at 874. Knuth also alleged that Popovitch violated three of its shop
rules. The Administrative Law Judge, however, found that Knuth was unable to articu-
late in precisely what manner Popovitch's conduct was covered by the rules. Id.
33 Id. at 874-75. The Administrative Law Judge wrote: "[T]here is no allegation that
[Knuth] committed any other unfair labor practices, and no evidence of other unlawful
conduct, which would support a finding of union animus, in these circum-
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also found that Popovitch did not intend to cause a boycott or
realize that his action might damage his employer's business.
34
Popovitch's failure to perceive the possible consequences of his
act is explained by the Administrative Law Judge's holding that
"the confidential natijre of the particular information revealed
by Popovitch's call to Schlitz [was] not established by [Knuth's]
shop practices or the industry contracts, was never made known
to employees generally or to Popovitch in particular, and was not
a significant concern in [Knuth's] reason for the discharge."35 In
the absence of intent to damage the employer's business, or at
least knowledge that such damage could result from his actions,
she held that Popovitch's action could not be considered
"disloyalty. ' 36 Despite Knuth's belief that Popovitch intended to
cause a boycott,37 the employee's action remained protected
under the well established principle 38 that
an employer's belief that his employee, in the course of
union activity, engaged in misconduct outside the pur-
view of Section 7, does not remove that protection
where the employee did not in fact commit the sus-
pected offense, and that a discharge for the suspected
misconduct violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3 9
As Popovitch had not in fact been disloyal, the discharge was
held to violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3) .4" The NLRB affirmed the
stances deemed necessary to support a violation based on pretext." Id. at 874. See 537
F.2d at 954.
34 218 N.L.R.B. at 876. This comment uses the term "boycott" in referring to any
employee-induced customer pressure on employers that could damage the employer's
business. For a discussion of the permissible limits of such activity during a labor dis-
pute, see text accompanying notes 82-98 infra. Neither Knuth Brothers nor the Seventh
Circuit used the term "boycott" in its technical legal sense. See 537 F.2d at 954-55.
35 218 N.L.R.B. at 876. The Administrative Law Judge stressed the absence of any
rule or policy against customer contacts which was "publicized to [the] employees." Id.
at 874. Knuth's explanation to new employees that it had no contact with the end-users
of its production did not sufficiently put them "on notice that some critical se-
crecy is involved in this respect." Id.36 Id. at 875-76.
a' See id. at 875. Knuth testified:
In our opinion, [he was] actually performing a boycott [by] asking somebody
why they're buying business forms from a non-union shop . .. causing pres-
sure on our dealer to send business to a union shop or trying to cause that
pressure. And we felt ... very strongly that if that was to happen ... it could
conceivably cost us many dollars in business ....
Id.
38See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
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8(a)(1) violation without further analysis. 41 Member Kennedy
dissented.42
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit refused to en-
force the NLRB's order because the findings of the Administra-
tive Law Judge and the NLRB were "not supported by sub-
stantial evidence to the extent they indicate that Knuth was not
concerned with the confidential nature of the business and to the
extent they indicate that Knuth was only concerned with losing
business through a secondary boycott. '43 The court did not ex-
pressly find that Popovitch had been put on notice of the confi-
dential relationship between Knuth and Prismagraphics.
44
Rather, it accorded controlling importance to Knuth's interest in
preserving good relations with its dealers. 45 It regarded an ac-
tion in reckless disregard of those relations, whether or not in-
tentional, as sufficient "misconduct" to justify discharge.46
11 Id. at 869. The NLRB held that "[t]he Administrative Law Judge properly found
that [Knuth's] discharge of Popovitch was not caused by any breach of confidentiality
on the part of Popovitch, but rather by an unfounded fear on the part of Gary Knuth,
Respondent's vice president, that Popovitch was attempting to initiate a secondary
boycott. ... Id. The NLRB found it unnecessary to pass on the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that Knuth's action in discharging Popovitch also violated section 8(a)(3)
since, under the principle of NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), the
violation of section 8(a)(1) was clear. 218 N.L.R.B. at 869 n.1.
42 218 N.L.R.B. 869, 869 (Member Kennedy, dissenting) The Seventh Circuit
adopted a position mearly identical to Member Kennedy's. See text accompanying note
48 infra.
13 537 F.2d at 955.
'4 See 537 F.2d at 951-52, 955. Although the court pointed out that new employees
at Knuth were informed that the company had no contact with customers, it did not
suggest that this placed the employees on notice that there was an important confidence
to be protected. Id. at 951-52. The court rejected the Administrative Law Judge's find-
ing that Knuth was unconcerned with the confidential nature of its business, but it did
not overturn her finding, 218 N.L.R.B. at 876, regarding the failure of Knuth's busi-
ness practices to establish the confidential nature sufficiently to alert the employees. See
537 F.2d at 955.
45 537 F.2d at 955. The court based its conclusion "on the failure of the ALJ and
the Board to recognize the impact of [Prismagraphics'] anger and the disastrous effect
the revelation could have had if Schlitz had not known the work was subcontracted." Id.
The relevant business interest considered was the potential loss of business from Pris-
magraphics, not the potential loss of Schlitz's business.
The court cited Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 214 N.L.R.B. 75 (1974), discussed in
text accompanying notes 75-76 infra, to establish that no specific rule against revealing
information is required for a finding of a breach of confidence. 537 F.2d at 955. The
Administrative Law Judge's finding that the disclosure lacked significance because
Knuth didn't remember if business from Prismagraphics and Schlitz fell off after the
incident was dismissed as irrelevant since Prismagraphics' uncontroverted anger, which
threatened Knuth with the loss of its substantial business, was sufficient to give Knuth a
significant business interest. Id. Further, the union contract clause protecting confi-
dences and Knuth's previous experience of losing a dealer's business as a result of a
breach of confidence were mentioned as supporting the existence of a demonstrated
and bona fide trust. Id.
46 See 537 F.2d at 956.
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Although Knuth could have effectively protected the trust
simply by giving its employees explicit notice of its existence, the
court believed discharge was appropriate in this case because of
the particular harm threatened by this breach of confidence. An
employee is regarded as "disloyal" in the highly sensitive context
of customer relations when he negligently threatens harm to his
employer's business by his union activity.47 The court explained:
Since Popovitch was a pressman, he never had any ex-
cuse whatever for meddling in his Employer's dealings
with its customers, and an explicit prohibition would
not be necessary. Popovitch's conduct was clearly far
beyond the scope of duties for which he was paid, and
thus he must be held to have been aware that he was
meddling in his Employer's business affairs without
authorization.
48
Popovitch was found negligent in making his inquiry of Schlitz
because he "need not have revealed any information which he
learned in the course of his employment to have accomplished
his objective. ' 49 Without revealing his employer, he could have
told Schlitz that he was with the Pressman's Union involved in
an organizational campaign and asked whether it considered
union status in awarding work. 0 Alternatively, he could have
attempted to verify his suspicion by contacting the dealer, whose
name he knew. Neither approach would have either com-
promised the confidential employer-dealer relationship, or
threatened the employer's business.
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF SECTION 7 PROTECTED
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
A. Statutory Scheme and the Test for a Section 8(a)(1) Violation
An employee's right to engage in concerted activity under
section 7 is protected by making employer interference with that
41 See id. The court reasoned:
In revealing the information, Popovitch acted in reckless disregard of his
employer's business interests. Respondent had the right to expect its employees
to use greater care in using information acquired in the course of their em-
ployment. Failure to use such care was an act of disloyalty to respondent. His
avowed purpose of aiding the organizational campaign is insufficient to protect
him from the effects of his misconduct and constituted cause for discharge.
Id.
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right an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1). 5 ' In addition
to this general prohibition, four specific practices are outlawed,
including the section 8(a)(3) ban on "discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 52 The statutory scheme
covering discharges is completed by a proviso to section 10(c)
protecting an employer's right to discharge an employee for
"cause." 53 By its terms section 8(a)(3) would seem not to cover
Popovitch's discharge because an intent to discriminate is an
element of that unfair labor practice. The exact nature of the
intent required remains uncertain, however. 54 The Administra-
tive Law Judge found a section 8(a)(3) violation despite her find-
ing that Knuth was not motivated by anti-union animus. 55 The
NLRB, however, found in unnecessary to consider the section
8(a)(3) issue since it found a clear violation of section 8(a)(1). 56 It
has long been recognized that evidence of anti-union intent is
not necessary to make out a violation of section 8(a)(1). 57 With
5" Note 2 supra.
52 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Sections 8(a)(2)-(5) are particularizations of the
8(a)(1) proscription. They were intended to help the courts enforce the general declara-
tion of rights in 8(a)(1) in certain areas where experience has shown a need for amplifi-
cation and specification. Labor Disputes Act, Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm.
on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 at 2487 (1949) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
They are not exclusive, however, and do not limit the scope of § 8(a)(1)'s omnibus
guarantee of freedom. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 2924
(1949). See, e.g., Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(aX) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of
Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 492-94 (1967).
51 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Section 10(c) provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee
who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was suspended or discharged for cause." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 42-43 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 333-34 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 38-40, 54-55, 59 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 542-44, 558-59, 563 (1948); Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1947);
Note, Strike Misconduct: An Illusory Bar to Reinstatement, 72 YALE L.J. 182, 186-90 (1962).
54 See, e.g., Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Janofsky,
New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination under the NLRA: The Legacy of American
Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1970); Oberer, supra
note 52, at 500; 46 N.C.L. REV. 975, 980 (1968); 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 616, 621
(1971).
51 218 N.L.R.B. at 874, 876.
56 218 N.L.R.B. at 871 n. 1.
" See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965);
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Getman,
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intent eliminated from the analysis, the Seventh Circuit was
faced with a conflict between the policies expressed by sections
10(c) and 8(a)(1).
Sections 10(c) and 8(a)(1) pose essentially the same question
from opposite sides of the labor-management conflict: which
concerted activities are "appropriate" for section 7 protection
and which activities constitute "cause" for which an employer
may discipline an employee without committing an unfair labor
practice?58 When Congress added the section 10(c) proviso in
1948,59 it conveyed to the NLRB the message that "undesirable
concerted activities are not to have any protection under the Act,
and to the extent that the Board in the past has accorded protec-
tion to such activities, [this proviso] makes such protection no
longer possible.1
61
Where section 7's protection of concerted activities ends and
section 10(c)'s "cause" for discharge begins depends on the bal-
ance struck by the NLRB between the prejudice to the
employee's section 7 rights and the employer's interest in pre-
venting disruption of his operation.61 Thus, when a court or the
NLRB holds that an activity is "unprotected" or that an em-
ployee is "disloyal" it is stating a legal conclusion reflecting, usu-
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L.
REv. 735, 756-61 (1965). But see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
308-11 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1965); NLRB v. Dalton Brick &
Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1962).
58See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962); NLRB v.
Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Note, Strike Misconduct: An Illusory Bar to Re-
instatement, 72 YALE L.J. 182, 186 (1962). See also Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1196
(1967).
59 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
6, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 at 543 (1948).
61 See, e.g. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1963); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (Buffalo Linen); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945). See also Getman, supra note 58, at 1199, 1209; Oberer, supra note 52, at 503,
515; 46 N.C.L. REv. 975, 980 (1968). But see American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300, 317 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-500
(1960). In these later cases the Supreme Court criticized the NLRB's balancing of the
economic weapons available to labor and management in enforcing collective bargaining
demands as inconsistent with the Act's policy favoring free collective bargaining. These
cases are difficult to reconcile with the Court's balancing approach in Erie Resistor. They
did not, however, involve discharges of individual employees for engaging in concerted
activity. Insurance Agents involved a finding that the company refused to bargain in good
faith, and American Ship Building involved a lockout. In both, the NLRB had explicitly
attempted to adjust the relative bargaining power of unions and management.
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ally sub silentio, the outcome of this balancing process. The term
"disloyalty" is nothing more than a conclusory label with no in-
dependent explanatory value. In considering why Popovitch's
conduct might be labeled "disloyal," it is necessary to examine
other "unprotected" activities to isolate the crucial factors in the
balancing process 62 particularly in the areas of breach of confi-
dence and employees' dealings with customers.
B. A Brief Outline of the Protective Scope of Section 7
The phrase "concerted activity" is a term of art that should
not be read literally.6 3 Many organizational or union related ac-
tions, which are clearly "concerted activity" in fact have been
held not to be within the contemplated ambit of section 7 protec-
tion. Protection has not been given, for example, to employees
who act illegally in the course of concerted activity. Section 7
does not extend to employees striking to force the commission of
an unfair labor practice, 64 or to employees striking in violation of
a mutiny statute,6 5 or to employees striking to enforce a wage
demand in violation of the Wage Stabilization Act.66 Moreover,
any conduct in the course of an otherwise lawful strike that
violates criminal or tort laws subjects the individual employee to
possible discharge. 67 Section 7 does not require an employer to
tolerate behavior specifically condemned by other laws. In a simi-
lar line of cases, the courts have denied protection to conduct
6 2See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IXD. L.J. 319
(1951).63 Id. at 319 n.2; Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The
Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152, 153-54 (1972).
64 Thompson Prods., Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947), vacating 70 N.L.R.B. 13 (1946).
Thompson's employees struck to force the recognition of a union after another union
had been certified. Thompson's acquiesence would have violated section 8(a)(2).
6s Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
66 American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
67 In the leading strike misconduct case, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240 (1939), the Court held that a sit-down strike and seizure of a factory building
was unlawful conduct unprotected by § 7. See Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec-
trical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (mass
picketing blocking access is unprotected); Hotel Employees' Local 122 v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942) (violent picketing unprotected). But see
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other
grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (in the context of heated dispute relatively minor miscon-
duct will not bar reinstatement). Another line of cases holds that reinstatement may be
appropriate when the employee's misconduct has been provoked by employer unfair
labor practices. See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
883 (1954); Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1960), enforced in part, remanded in part sub
noain. Kohler Co. v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962), on
remand 148 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 836 (1965).
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that undermines collective bargaining. 68 This position is justified
by the inconsistency of protecting activity that undermines the
fundamental policy of the Act. 69 Both lines of cases reflect
specific policy choices basic to any determination of the proper
scope of the national labor law and are not the result of any
desire to protect the employer himself from concerted activity.
The desire to allow some special protection for employers in
certain unusual situations is important in a separate line of cases,
the so-called "disloyalty" cases. In these cases, "disloyalty" sig-
nifies a legal conclusion that management interests are of such
importance that they outweigh any concomitant frustration of
union rights. In this sense the disloyalty cases are similar to the
related line of partial strike cases.7 Although the latter cases are
often justified on the grounds that partial strikes are immoral or
distasteful to the community's idea of an employee's duty to his
employer, 71 a more likely rationale for denying section 7 protec-
tion is that such a weapon would destroy the balance of power
between management and union. The partial strike could totally
cripple an employer's business at little or no expense to the
union.72 The employer's right to demand the loyalty of his
6See Emporium Capewell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (strikes in breach of
a collective bargaining contract); Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482, (6th Cir.
1960) (minority strike by employees dissatisfied with the union's settlement of their
seniority rights and transfer pay); NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1958) (walkout and refusal to state grievances); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207
F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953) (wildcat work stoppage); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d
199 (4th Cir. 1944) (minority strike by employees dissatisfied with the progress of
negotiations). But cf. NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964) (minority
strike intended to support union's position protected if not in violation of no-strike
pledge).
" See Cox, supra note 62, at 328-33.
7" The Supreme Court's decision in UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (unannounced work stoppages), accepted the view that
employees are unprotected by section 7 when, without going on strike, they accept their
wages while disrupting the operation of their employer's business. See NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946) (refusal to handle correspondence of
a struck plant); United Biscuit Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942) (slowdowns);
C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939) (refusal to work overtime). See
also Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1956) (recruitment by em-
ployee of other highly-trained employees to work for employer's competitors "disloyal"
like slow-down or sit-down strike).
71 See Cox, supra note 62, at 338; Schatzki, Some Obser'ations and Suggestions Concern-
ing a Misnomer--"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REv. 378, 379-80 (1969).
72 Schatzki, supra note 71, at 382. Schatzki also observed that "partial strikes are
no more distasteful or 'immoral' than strikes, picketing, and other protected devices
used by unions and employees to defeat the employer in economic battle. All are a form
of disloyalty; all are an attempt to interfere with the boss's business." Id. at 379-80.
Another class of "disloyalty" cases expressing a strong respect for employer interest
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workers while they are receiving his pay is too central to the
balance of economic power for the courts to allow section 7
protection.
This same calculus of rights can be seen in the disloyalty
cases. These break down into two basic groups: those dealing
with breach of employer confidence and those dealing with em-
ployee interference in customer relations. In these cases,
whether they justified their decisions because of the "immoral-
ity" of disloyalty or because of a preceived threat to the economic
balance of power, courts have usually allowed the employer's
interests to outweigh the employee's section 7 protection. Ele-
ments of both groups of disloyalty cases can be found in Knuth
Brothers, but neither line would seem to justify the Seventh
Circuit's result.
1. Breach of Employer Confidence
The basic rule of the breach of confidence cases is that "em-
ployees are entitled to use ... information and knowledge which
comes to their attention in the normal course of work activity...
but aren't entitled to their Employer's private and confidential
records. '7 3 The issue in these cases usually focuses on whether
the information divulged is in fact confidential and whether the
employee was put on notice of its confidential nature.7 4 In Bell
Federal Savings and Loan Association7 5 a switchboard operator who
told her union how many telephone calls her employer received
from his lawyer in the course of one day argued that she was
protected from dismissal because her employer never promul-
gated a rule designating such information as confidential. The
NLRB held that the absence of a prior rule is not controlling
involves strikes to influence the choice of supervisors. Concerted activity designed to
interfere with such a "prerogative of management" is unprotected. See, e.g., Cleaver-
Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959);
NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947). See Getman, supra note
45, at 1211-18.
,' Ridgley Mfg. Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 193, 196-97 (1973), enforced, 510 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). See Anserphone, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 305 (1970); Steele Apparel Co., 172
N.L.R.B. 903, 912-13 (1968), enforced, 437 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1971); Murray-Ohio Mfg.
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1541 (1964), enforced, 358 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1966).
74 See Farlow Rubber Supply, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1971) (employee urged a
clerk to disclose information that would have been so valuable to a competitor that it
was kept in a fireproof vault); Vitronic, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1078 (1970) (confiden-
tiality of material evidenced by employee's gathering it furtively and denying it when
confronted by employer). See also News-Texan, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1038 (1969);
Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1193 (1968).
75 214 N.L.R.B. 75 (1974).
NLRB v. KNUTH BROTHERS
when the information is of an obviously confidential nature.7 6 In
Southern and Western Lumber Co.,77 the NLRB elaborated on the
indicia of confidentiality necessary for a breach amounting to
"disloyalty." Notecards containing the names and addresses of
employees and kept in a supervisor's office were held not to have
sufficient appearance of confidentiality because no announced
policy declared them to be confidential, and the nature of the
information and the place and manner in which it was kept did
not give the employees any "reason to believe that any such
policy of confidentiality existed. 7 8
In view of this standard and the Administrative Law Judge's
finding in Knuth Brothers that "the confidential nature of the
particular information revealed . . . [was] not established by
[Knuth's] shop practices . . . [and] was never made known to
employees generally or to Popovitch in particular,7 9 it is dif-
ficult to justify the Seventh Circuit's finding of disloyalty. A
good, perhaps even convincing, case can be made that the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's findings of fact were, in fact, wrong.
80
Knuth argued persuasively that the indicia of confidentiality
were more than sufficient to put Popovitch on notice of the
relationship, and that he knew or should have known of its
importance.81 But such a holding would have required the
Seventh Circuit to overrule the finder of fact at least as to the
extent of notice, or as to Popovitch's intent, and this they were
unwilling to do. This being the case, it is truly remarkable that
Popovitch be found negligent in violating a confidence that he
did not know, nor could be expected to know, existed. If the
6 Id. at 77-78. In its Knuth Brothers brief, the NLRB distinguished Bell Federal on
the ground that "[n]othing so obviously confidential was involved here." Brief for
Petitioner at 10 n.6.
" 212 N.L.R.B. 668 (1974).
781 d. at 669.
79 218 N.L.R.B. at 876. See note 35 supra. The concern the NLRB and the courts
have shown for the employee's intent in gathering and disclosing information can be
seen in the duty they have imposed on the employee to represent accurately non-
confidential information to fellow employees and the employer. An employee loses the
protection of section 7 if the information he conveys is deliberately or maliciously false;
however, such intent will not be lightly inferred from a misstatement. NLRB v. Illinois
Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815-16 (7th Cir. 1946) (no improper motive where the
misleading statements are prompted by excitement); Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1319 (1962); Paul Cusano, 92 N.L.R.B. 1272, 1284, enforced sub nom. Cusano v.
NLRB, 190 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1951) (dictum); Atlantic Towing Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
1169, 1173 (1948). Compare Whitin Machine Works, 100 N.L.R.B. 279, 291 n.22 (1952)
(dictum) with Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 1058, 1060-61 (1948), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 179 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1949).
8, See note 16 supra.
81 See Brief for Respondent, at 11-22.
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court's position can not be justified by the breach of confiden-
tiality cases, it might be better understood through an examina-
tion of the second line of disloyalty cases.
2. Interference with Customer Relations
It may have been that the obvious harm done by Popovitch
to customer relations forced the court's negative reaction. Trad-
itionally, the degree to which an employer's customer relations
are insulated from his employee's concerted activities depends in
part on whether the employees are on strike. Striking employees
may appeal to customer sympathy and urge them to boycott the
employer's product for the duration of the strike.8 2 They may
not, however, appeal to the customer's business sense by urging
a boycott based on the assertion that the product's quality is
poor. In the leading disparagement case, NLRB v. Local 1229,
IBEW Uefferson Standard),83 the Supreme Court held that the
distribution by non-striking employees of a handbill disparaging
the employer's product without making reference to the under-
lying labor dispute was unprotected "disloyalty" and constituted
"cause" for discharge within the meaning of section 10(c). The
NLRB later extended this rule to reach disparaging attacks made
by strikers alleging that product quality suffered as a result of
the substitution of inexperienced replacements for the strikers.
8 4
Only recently has the NLRB allowed an exception where the
employer's product is nothing more than a service performed by
the strikers.85 In those cases strikers may publicize the labor
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
83 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
14 Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956) (3 to 2 split). In Patterson, strik-
ing employees of a paint company handed out handbills warning customers that be-
cause of the strike the paint would not be made by the well trained employees who
made the paint the customers always bought. The NLRB held that such an attack is
"disloyal" even if true. Id. at 1629. Accord Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B.
1050 (1970), enforced, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See M Restaurants, Inc., 223
N.L.R.B. 100 (1975) (restaurant patrons told food was unfit to eat). But cf. Black Angus,
Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 425, 433 (1974) (disparaging remarks made only a few impulsive
times during five-week unfair labor practice strike).
85 Hennepin Broadcasting Assocs., 225 N.L.R.B. 66 (1976). The NLRB held
that "where the ultimate product provided by the primary employer . . . is a service
performed by the strikers, it is difficult for a striker to publicize his strike activity to
purchasers of that service without somehow suggesting that the service was better per-
formed by him than by his replacement." Id. (slip op. at 36). See Frontier Guard Patrol,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 155 (1966), enforced, 399 F.2d 716 (10 Cir. 1968) (letter from strikers
to customers stating that they did not see how their employer could "presently be ren-
dering the service you need" held not sufficiently disparaging). Cf Community Hospital
of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976), enforcing 220 N.L.R.B.
217 (1975) (non-striker's activity disparaging quality of hospital's services protected).
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dispute by suggesting that the strikers performed the services
better than their replacements. Given the difficulty in distin-
guishing an employee's direct work with a customer from his
work on the production of an item for sale to customers, this
evolution may suggest that the NLRB is modifying its position
on disparaging attacks explicitly related to a strike. Where the
disparaging attack is not explicitly tied to a current strike, the
NLRB can correctly conclude that the employer's interest in pre-
venting peraanent damage to his product's reputation justifies
the employee's discharge since customers may continue the
boycott after the dispute is resolved. The threat to the em-
ployer's interest is mitigated, however, when the attack is care-
fully tied to a current dispute. In that case, as in appeals for
customer sympathy, the employees are only trying to make the
employer feel the full impact of the strike. If product quality
suffers due to the employer's use of untrained replacements, the
employees should be protected in making the employer feel the
full cost of that disruption. A more restrictive application of the
disparagment rule is overly protective of the employer's interest
in insulating his customer relations at the expense of an
employee's legitimate strike weapon.
Not surprisingly, the "disloyalty" standard applied in the
customer relations area to non-striking employees is stricter than
that applied to strikers. The Seventh Circuit in Hoover Co. v.
NLRB8 6 held that non-striking employees are not protected in
urging customers to support them in a labor dispute by boycot-
ting the employer's product. The Supreme Court in Jefferson
Standard relied on the Hoover assertion that "an employee can
not collect wages for his employment and, at the same time, en-
gage in activities to injure or destroy his employer's busi-
ness" 87 to support its holding.8 8 Popovitch's "disloyalty" was
grounded in this same sweeping doctrine. 89 As in the case of
partial strikes, this holding cannot be adequately explained by
the immorality of "biting the hand that feeds you." Rather, the
holding implies a judgment that such a weapon is too destructive
of employer interests with no cost to employees.
What is most striking about all of the cases on interference
with customer relations is that they require an intent to harm.
Whereas the breach of confidence cases imposed a negligence
86 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
87 346 U.S. at 476 n.12 (quoting Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 389 (7th Cir.
1951)).
88 For a discussion of Jefferson Standard, see text accompanying note 83 supra.
89 See 537 F.2d at 953-54.
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standard based on the indicia of confidentiality, the second line
of cases by definition turns on intent. An employee can not
disparage his employer's product or business without intending
to do so. Nor can an employee organize a boycott against his
employer without intending to harm him. A striker may only
rarely do the former, but may do the latter. A non-striker, for
the most part, can do neither."° But this distinction is between
two groups of employees, both of whom intend to harm their
employers' business. Once again, it might be reasonable to sug-
gest that Popovitch did intend to organize a boycott,91 but the
contrary finding was made by the Administrative Law Judge,
and neither the NLRB nor the Seventh Circuit rejected this find-
ing. If this finding is allowed to stand, the Seventh Circuit's
decision seems unsupportable by prior case law.
Moreover, it might be added that even a finding of an intent
to boycott would not be dispositive of the case. An employer's
interest in preventing customer interference by non-striking
employees is not absolute. In Edir, Inc. ,92 the NLRB held that a
non-striking employee was protected in picketing his employer's
place of business on his own time in the context of an organiza-
tional campaign. Refusing to accord determinative weight to
prejudice to the employer, the NLRB distinguished Jefferson
Standard on the basis of the lack of disparagement and the direct
tie to a current labor dispute in the Edir situation where a tradi-
tional union weapon, the picket line, was employed.
93
Protection was also extended to the employee in Knuth
Brother's companion case before the NLRB, Circle Bindery Inc. 94
In Circle Binder)y an active union member, who was employed in a
non-union bindery, noticed that the bindery was doing work
under the union label for a unionized printer which was bound
by a collective bargaining agreement to subcontract work bearing
the union label only to unionized binderies. 95 The union mem-
ber caused his non-union employer to lose the job and was fired
for "disloyalty." The NLRB held that this intentional injury to
customer relations by a non-striking employee was protected be-
"'The ban on non-striker "disloyalty" is not total. See text accompanying notes
92-98 infra.
91 See note 16 supra.
92 159 N.L.R.B. 686 (1966).
93 Id. at 694-95.
94 218 N.L.R.B. 861 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d
447 (1st Cir. 1976).
9- NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447, 449 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1976).
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cause the employee was merely enforcing the union label. The
NLRB argued that the union's section 7 interest in "protect[ing]
... a vital union asset, the union label" 96 outweighed the employ-
er's "loss of business.19 7 The First Circuit enforced the NLRB's
order in an opinion which emphasized the court's belief that it
should defer to the NLRB's balancing of employer and employee
interests.
98
Given these cases extending section 7 protection to non-
striking employees who intended to harm the employer's cus-
tomer relations, the Seventh Circuit's refusal to protect an em-
ployee engaged in concerted activities who never intended any
harm to these relations is, at best, surprising.
III. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, this departure from existing case law is not
only novel, but unwelcome. When an employee intentionally vio-
lates a legitimate employer policy, the employer may fire him in
order to maintain discipline in the plant. On the other hand, an
unintentional breach of confidence poses no such threat to plant
discipline. The employer's interest can be protected simply by
making it known to the employees. There is no reason to deny
section 7 protection to a class of concerted activity under the
guise of protecting an employer interest that is not really
threatened.
The court found Popovitch's conduct to be unprotected
"disloyalty" in the absence of intent by introducing the factor
that "he never had any excuse whatever for meddling in his
Employer's dealings with its customers." 99 While dealing with
customers in the course of concerted activity, the employee is
responsible for unintentionally, but negligently, risking damage
to his employer's relations with those customers. It is difficult,
however, to fault Popovitch for failing to use due care in pre-
serving a trust he had no reason to believe existed. The Seventh
Circuit's emphasis on protecting the employer's customer in-
terests was misplaced since Popovitch never purposely threat-
ened those interests. In all earlier cases the employees had acted
deliberately; the only means available to the employer to effec-
tively protect his customer interests was the threat of discharge.
96 218 N.L.R.B. at 862.
97Id.
98 536 F.2d at 452-53.
99 537 F.2d at 956 (quoting 218 N.L.R.B. 869, 871 (Member Kennedy, dissenting)).
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Given these incongruities, one is tempted to speculate that the
Seventh Circuit wished to reject the Administrative Law Judge's
intent findings. Such a result might raise serious questions about
the weight to be accorded the findings of both the Administra-
tive Law Judge and the NLRB, but it would be far preferable to
a decision which needlessly sacrifices employees' section 7 rights
in cases in which the employer could adequately have protected
his interest by merely informing his employees of the
confidence's existence and importance.
